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Introduction
Feminist scholars and activists regularly defend public policies that support care-
giving and care-givers. Some of these policies support care directly, by entitling to 
financial compensation individuals who provide care to their family members and who 
thereby often forego employment or downsize their career ambitions. Examples include a
mandate that employers split the paycheck between their employee and their stay at home
partner1, or a ‘caregiver’s allowance’ in the form of a voucher given to parents who 
provide hands-on care2. Other measures are meant to support the combination of care-
giving and paid work, and include paid and relatively long parental leaves, flexible 
working hours for parents, better compensated part-time work and subsidies for non-
parental childcare3. Finally, some policies whose aims are more general – such as a 
universal basic income – would also support-caregivers,4. These diverse policies are 
justified by different considerations. Yet, most5 of them trigger a general feminist worry: 
1 Anne Alstott, No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children and What Society Owes Parents. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004.
2 Susan Moller Okin, Justice Gender and the Family, New York: Basic Books,1989.
3 Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000; Janet Gornik and Marcia Meyers, Families That Work. Policies for 
Reconciling Parenthood and Employment. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003; Gina Schouten, 
Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor, Oxford University Press, 2019.
4 Julieta Elgarte, “BI and the Gendered Division of Labour”, BI Studies 3(3), 2008;  John Baker, All Things 
Considered, Should Feminists Embrace BI?, BI Studies 3(3), 2008.
5 But not the subsidising of non-parental care, which of all the listed policies, would actually enable women 
to compete with men as full-time employers.
that protecting care-givers unavoidably provides women with incentives to opt out of the 
labour market at higher rates than they already do, and at much higher rates than men. 
This, the criticism goes, will reinforce statistical discrimination and sexist stereotypes 
that portray women as less well-performing employees, and thus further undermine 
equality of opportunities between women and men for positions of advantage.
This criticism, I argue, doesn’t generate a powerful reason against care-supporting
policies – not in general, and even less so in unjustly unequal societies. My broad 
argument is as follows: even if it is true that supporting care makes it more difficult for 
women to access positions of advantage compared to men, it is also likely to improve the 
overall condition of women who are most disadvantaged by their care-giving social role. 
Not all the above policy proposals would benefit the worst off women equally, but all 
would do so considerably. At the same time, it is mostly better off women who have an 
interest in equal opportunities to positions of advantage. It is highly plausible that the 
interests of the worst off ought to be given priority. Here I will not engage in any detail 
with this general argument but focus, instead, on the particularly strong case in favour of 
supporting care-giving in unjust societies.
I assume that existing societies fail to observe any plausible principle of 
distributing outcomes. I don’t commit here to a particular theory of justice; such a 
principle may be luck-egalitarian, permitting only inequalities that track individual 
responsibility, and therefore deeming as unjust cases where some people are worse off 
than others out of no fault or choice of their own. Or it can be a prioritarian principle, 
requiring that the worse off an individual is, the more weight we give to her interests. Or 
it can be a Rawlsian principle, allowing only for inequalities that are necessary to 
improve the prospects of the worst-off members of society6. Finally, much of my analysis
should also appeal to sufficientarians, who rule out inequalities to the extent to which 
they leave some individuals under a threshold of sufficiency. Societies which fail to 
conform to any of these principles, or alternative principles of justice, I will call ‘unjust 
societies. In unjust societies, the better off women lack a claim of justice with respect to 
many of the most advantageous jobs. To this conclusion I advance two arguments. The 
first applies to the very best jobs, which I call, by stipulation, “top positions”. This is a 
placeholder term, but plausible candidates include being the CEO of a large company, the
best paid jobs in the entertainment industry etc. The second argument applies to positions 
of advantage in general, plausible examples of which are jobs in law, academia, medicine
etc. Given its focus on conflicts of interests between worse off and better off women, this 
paper echoes the current popular debates between a feminism interested in the fate of 
poor and marginalised women and so-called “boardroom feminism”. While I cannot 
engage directly with this debate here, my overall argument provides support to the 
former. I rely on a common distinction between equality of outcome – concerning where 
people end up with respect to, for instance, income, social status, or power – and equality 
of opportunity for such outcomes – that is, a level-playing filed in competing for the 
outcomes.
Argument 1
P1 Nobody has a right to a position that confers unjust advantages on those who hold it.
P2 We ought to discount the value of equality of opportunity for positions to which 
6 In Rawls’ overall theory of justice this principle determines which social positions should exist. Rawls 
believes that access to these positions should be governed by a principle of fair equality of opportunities 
(discussed below.)
nobody has a right.
P3 Many of the top positions in societies with large unjustifiable inequalities of outcome 
confer unjust advantages on those who hold them.
C1 Therefore, we ought to discount the value of equality of opportunity for many of the 
top positions in societies with large unjustifiable inequalities of outcome.
There is a legitimate question about the relationship between the magnitude of 
unjustifiable inequalities attached to a position and the plausibility of P2 with respect to 
that position. One possibility is that the more modest the deviation from justice, the less 
we should discount the value of distributing the position in question according to equality
of opportunity. So, for instance, if the pay-offs attached to a position deviate only 
marginally from what justice permits, it is almost as desirable to distribute it according to 
equality of opportunity as it is in the case of positions that carry permissible rewards. I 
cannot address this problem properly here, but I assume that at least some top positions in
existing societies involve benefits that are entirely out of proportion with the demands of 
distributive justice, and that we should attach almost no value to distributing those 
positions according to equality of opportunity.
Argument 2
P4 Most people who have a shot at positions of advantage are likely to already have had 
more than their fair share of opportunities for such positions.
P5 People lack a claim to more than their fair share of opportunities for positions of 
advantage.
C2 Therefore, most people who have a shot at positions of advantage do not have a claim 
to more opportunities then they already have for such positions.
According to several feminists, the fact that a policy worsens the inequalities of 
opportunities between women and men to positions of advantage is a serious 
consideration against them7, perhaps even a defeating one8. Against these views, 
Arguments 1 and 2 show that all women lack a claim to top positions and most women 
who stand a chance for positions of advantage lack a claim to more opportunities for 
them than they already have. But all women do have special claims against men having 
more opportunities for them, including for top positions: this is a complaint grounded in 
the expressive disvalue of inequality of opportunities between women and men – as I 
explain below. The complaint provides grounds for implementing policies that combat 
gender stereotypes which associate women with care and present them as less desirable 
workers than men. In particular, the expressive complaint supports policies implementing
gender parity in the distribution of positions of advantage. Such parity is desirable both 
for its immediate expressive value and, potentially, for its long-term consequences in 
breaking the association between women and domesticity on the one hand, and between 
men and paid employment on the other hand9. But one need not aim at the much more 
demanding ideal of equality of opportunities in order to address women’s expressive 
7 Ingrid Robeyns, “Hush Money or Emancipation Fee? A Gender Analysis of BI”. In R. van der Veen and L.
Groot (eds) BI on the Agenda. Policy Objectives and Political Chances. Amsterdam University Press, 
Amsterdam, 2000, pp.121–136; Ingrid Robeyns, “Will a BI do justice to women?”, Analyse und Kritik 
23:88-105, 2001; Anca Gheaus, “Basic Income, Gender Justice and the Costs of Gender-symmetrical 
Lifestyles”, Basic Income Studies, 3(3), 2008.
8 Harriet Baber, “Two Models of Preferential Treatment for Working Mothers”, Public Affairs Quarterly 
4(4):323-334 1990; Barbara Bergmann, “The Only Ticket to Equality: Total Androgyny, Male Style”, 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 9(75):76-86, 1998; Barbara Bergmann, “Long Leaves, Child Well-
Being, and Gender Equality”, Politics and Society 36(3):350-359, 2008.
9 Janet Radcliffe-Richards, “Only X%: The Problem of Sex Equality”, Journal of Practical Ethics 2(2), 
2014.
complaint.
I assume that, given the large unjustifiable inequalities of both outcome and of 
opportunities in contemporary societies, most positions where discrimination against 
women would increase due to care-supporting policies are likely to be like the positions 
in arguments 1 and 2. This is not a purely speculative point: the main feminist complaint 
against care-supporting policies is that they will increase a kind of discrimination against 
women which, as I explain below, is a lot more likely to affect access to positions of 
advantage. This is not to deny that other kinds of sexist discrimination apply also, or 
especially, to women in middle and lower grade jobs. But this is not the kind of 
discrimination likely to be enhanced by care-supporting policies. Therefore, care-
supporting policies are significantly less likely to increase inequality of opportunities 
between women and men for middle-grade jobs and even less so for lower-grade jobs. 
Moreover, with respect to the lowest-grade positions, such as menial work, the disvalue 
of a great many of these positions may also mean that opportunities for them are less 
important to individuals likely to occupy them than receiving care-giving support. 
Therefore, assuming that a care-supporting policy is otherwise justified, egalitarian 
feminists have much better reason to welcome than to resist it, even if it sets back 
women’s opportunities to positions of advantage.
Equal opportunities criticism against supporting care has been raised in 
connection with all the above-mentioned policies10. But the most articulated debate to 
date concerns the introduction, in existing developed societies, of a universal, 
unconditional basic income (henceforth “BI”) – that is, a regular income financed 
10 Baber 1990; Bergmann 2008; Claire Cain Miller, “When Family-Friendly Policies Backfire”, New York 
Times, 26th of May 2016.
through taxation and paid to all the members of a political community regardless of any 
other sources of income and independent from the recipients’ productive participation in 
social cooperation and of their level of financial need. Here I refer to the feminist debate 
concerning BI merely to illustrate the tradition of appealing to equality of opportunity for 
positions of advantage as a weighty reason against its introduction. All care-supporting 
policies are open to this criticism, since they are likely to activate the same mechanisms 
that incentivise the perpetuation of the gendered division of labour. I do not aim, as such, 
to defend any of these policies, the overall evaluation of which – especially in the case of 
BI – depends on many normative and empirical considerations, including matters of 
feasibility and existing alternatives. My aim is to assess, and reject, a particular argument 
against them.
The next section offers some theoretical clarifications; the third presents the 
feminist debate about the care-supporting effects of BI. In the fourth section I elaborate 
on Arguments 1 and 2 and their implications. I end with brief conclusions.
Background clarifications: feminist egalitarianism
There is broad consensus that equality must govern the access to some goods, 
such as political and civil rights, and that avoidable inequalities in the distribution of 
other goods require justification. Examples of the latter include resources (like money), 
welfare (that is, how well one’s life goes), and capabilities (for instance, being able to 
move freely), and, possibly, relational goods such as social inclusion and non-
stigmatisation11. Some philosophers justify departures from equality in the distribution of 
11 There is a debate on whether relational goods such as inclusion, non-stigmatisation or non-domination 
can be part of the metric of distributive justice. I assume they can, and argued so in “Hikers in Flip-Flops. 
Luck Egalitarianism, Democratic Equality and the Distribuenda of Justice”, Journal of Applied Philosophy 
35(1): 54-69, 2018. Taking a stance in this debate bears on the form, and scope, but not on the substance, of
such goods in cases where these departures result from individuals’ autonomous choices; 
others believe departures from equality are permissible if they are necessary in order to 
make the worst off as well off as possible. It is not obvious that any of these versions of 
egalitarianism – widely understood to include prioritarianism – involves, as such, any 
particular interest in whether more women than men are the victims of injustice, or in 
whether gender norms in particular (as opposed to other unjustified mechanisms) are 
responsible for inequalities. For instance, being a welfarist luck egalitarian – that is, 
endorsing equality of welfare – does not as such give you reason to find it particularly 
objectionable if women are disproportionately affected by unchosen inequalities in 
welfare due, for instance, to the gendered division of labour; on this view, what matters 
are inequalities in welfare between individuals.  Being a prioritarian does not as such give 
you reason to object to the feminisation of poverty. And being a relational egalitarian – 
believing that justice requires that individuals relate to each other as equals – does not as 
such give you reason to be particularly concerned with women’s social marginalisation or
stigmatisation. “As such”, because many egalitarians do in fact object to gendered 
inequalities; but, I assume, they do so in virtue of additional beliefs – for instance, 
concerning the role that a history of discrimination and oppression plays in explaining 
such inequalities.
By contrast, to be a feminist is to be interested in whether the group of those 
affected by injustice is gendered, at least to the extent to which inequalities can be 
attributable to gender norms. Feminism, too, comes in several varieties. A common 
denominator is the joint belief that (a) women and men are moral equals and therefore (b)
women and men should have equal opportunities, at each stage of life, to access those 
the present argument.
goods the distribution of which is relevant to justice. Many feminists also endorse the 
view that (c) women should not fare worse than men, on the relevant conception of 
justice, due, even in part, to their sex. The last point goes beyond the request for equal 
opportunities: it states that women should not be worse off merely because they have 
different competencies than men (if they do). So, for instance, if justice allows different 
compensation for different skills, and women end up being overly represented amongst 
the worst off because they tend to have skills that receive worse compensation on the 
market, feminists may object to the fact that pay-offs are attached to marketable skills in 
a way that disadvantages women. Depending on their particular conception of justice, 
different feminists will identify different inequalities as objectionable. For instance, to 
qualify as feminist, a libertarian must object to women suffering worse rights violations 
than men; sufficientarian feminists must object to the feminisation of poverty, etc.
Egalitarian feminists’ interest in distributive justice is at least in part fueled by a 
sense that in many societies women constitute the majority of those denied their fair share
– mainly in terms of wealth, status and power – and that this is due, in part, to the fact 
that they are women. This complaint goes beyond a complaint of unequal opportunities to
occupy positions of advantage. If women and men had the same opportunities – in the 
robust sense specified at (b) above – but more women than men ended up as poor, 
marginalised etc., egalitarian feminists could have a double complaint. The first is that, in
virtue of being egalitarians, they deem poverty unjust. But if this state of affairs is due to 
background economic rules and expectations that relegate care-givers to poverty, they 
also have grounds to complain in virtue of being feminists, even if women end up in 
caring positions via a distribution of work which is governed by equality of opportunity.
As specified by point (b) above, feminists believe that women and men should be 
able to compete unencumbered by socially created obstacles related to them being 
women or men. Some, such as Janet Radcliffe-Richards, believe that this requirement 
fully captures feminists demands concerning the distribution of positions of advantage12. I
don’t deny that equality of opportunity between women and men at each stage of life is a 
worthy, and weighty, goal. But – as the arguments of this paper show – in societies that 
harbour large unjustified inequalities of outcome we should discount this widely-held 
ideal of gender justice when applied to positions of advantage. In such circumstances, 
feminists should, instead, strive to eliminate the feminisation of the worst off group.
The feminist argument against care-supporting policies
Feminists have always been divided on the merits of care-supporting policies with
respect to how they would affect women and gender equality. As already indicated, at 
least some of the disagreement is principled: such policies are likely to significantly 
improve, on the whole, the material situation, power and status of the worst off women, 
and in particular care-givers, while at the same time making it harder to achieve the goal 
of equal opportunities between women and men for the best jobs. 
The debate about BI provides a detailed illustration of this feminist conundrum. 
BI would help lift from poverty women in jobs with low pay, few benefits and little 
security. If generous enough to provide financial independence, BI would provide exit to 
women who are in abusive domestic relationships and economically dependent on their 
partners. It would also protect from old age poverty women who have not joined the 
labour market (or left it prematurely) and who therefore do not qualify for welfare 
12 Radcliffe-Richards 2014.
benefits13. It would therefore benefit women who find themselves in these circumstances 
due to their caring responsibilities. At the same time, BI is likely to have a negative effect
on women’s opportunities in the labour market and, possibly, on their access to positions 
of power and prestige14. One of the earliest feminist concerns was that BI will diminish 
women’s participation in the labour market by making it affordable for more women to 
opt out of paid work – fully or partially – and instead do care work in the family.15 
Having withdrawn from paid work for a period and “specialised” in care work, it then 
becomes more difficult for women to access positions of advantage when they re-enter 
the labour market; more likely, such women will continue to be mainly care-providers or 
stuck in undesirable jobs. The status quo is already bad. In Europe, for instance, in spite 
of doing well, and sometimes out-competing men, in higher education, women make up 
the vast majority of part-time workers. They are a lot less likely than men to hold a job if 
they have children under 12, have an overall lower employment rate, earn less, and 
represent only a small fraction of executive boards’ membership or holders of top 
positions such as CEO16. Women also tend to do more voluntary work and informal, 
unpaid, care work, which is usually low status. As a result, they earn less and have less 
decision-making power than men as well as lower social status.
Some philosophers think that feminists should welcome policies that enlarge 
13 Ann Whithorn, “Is One Man’s Ceiling Another Woman’s Floor?”, in K. Widerquist, J. Noguera, Y. 
Vanderborght and J. De Wispelaere (eds.), Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research, Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013, pp.145-148; Robeyns 2000; Elgarte, 2008.
14 Robeyns 2000; Gheaus 2008. I cannot evaluate here the accuracy of these predictions, nor is this 
necessary for the sake of a normative analysis of the argument from equal opportunities.
15 Ann Orloff, “Why BI does not Promote Gender Equality”, in Widerquist et al. 2013, pp.149-152. It is 
worth noting that, by keeping women away from the job market, BI can in some cases set back their 
emancipation from abusive relationships. Employment gives people access to social networks. However, it 
does not do so uniquely: volunteering – for which BI has been said to provide incentives– has the same 
benefit.
16 “Gender statistics”, Eurostat, February 2017 and “Gender balance on corporate boards”, European 
Commission, July 2016.
women’s opportunity sets even if as a result women will participate (even) less in the 
labour market. On this view, women’s lower market attachment is a morally innocent 
effect because it reflects individual women’s choices17. This argument, however, is too 
quick – as two feminist rejoinders show.
Not always their (voluntary) choices
The first feminist rejoinder is that, at least sometimes, women’s decisions to 
prioritise caring for children, elderly parents or sick relatives do not carry the usual 
normative implications of autonomous choice because they are not made under the 
circumstances necessary for full autonomy. Women are (still) being socialised into 
assuming caring roles – with the help of gender-specific toys and bodily discipline, 
educational activities and generally by being pressured to comply with feminine social 
roles through active encouragements and/or through penalties. If so, perhaps women who 
choose part-time paid work or full-time home-making in order to look after family 
members in need for care don’t enjoy the same degree of autonomy that a person with a 
less gendered socialisation would enjoy in an otherwise identical choice context. It then 
seems unfair for such women to pay the full price of their choices in terms of loss of 
income, status and loss of other goods that one can only access through (good) jobs18. 
Policies are objectionable to the extent to which they sponsor imprudent choices for 
which the choice-makers lack full responsibility. The feminist worry that care-supporting 
policies will encourage some women to leave the job market in order to care more is 
17 Moreover, in Philippe Van Parijs’s words: “there is something insulting about considering women, in 
particular less-skilled women, to be less able than men to make a wise use of these expanded options.” 
Yannick Vanderborght and Karl Widerquist, “The Feminist Response to BI” in Widerquist et al. 2013, 
p.142.
18 Anca Gheaus and Lisa Herzog, “The Goods of Work (Other than Money!)”, Journal of Social Philosophy 
47(1): 70-89, 2016.
indeed premised on the thought that this is can be an imprudent choice.
Recently, the gendered socialisation worry has taken one specific form, for which 
psychologists have coined a new term: stereotype threat. This is the fear that others will 
perceive you in light of negative stereotypes associated with the group with which you 
identify – in this case, gender – fear of which tends to inadvertently confirm the existing 
stereotypes19. There are reasons to think that women suffer from stereotype threat when 
performing within the traditional “male” territory and, as a result, perform worse than 
they would otherwise perform (and worse than men) precisely because they are expected 
to do so. This can explain, to some extent, women’s lower achievements in fields 
dominated by, and traditionally associated with, men20. It may also explain, in part, 
women’s higher willingness to leave the job market. Again, a policy sponsoring an 
imprudent choice, choice whose causal history that includes (possibly many) episodes of 
non-autonomous choices is, to that extent, objectionable.
Finally, a woman’s opting out of the labour market in order to care for someone in
need of care can fail to qualify as a fully autonomous choice for an entirely different 
reason. Even someone who was free from any gendered socialisation, and unsusceptible 
to stereotype threat, could nevertheless have her autonomy curtailed because she finds 
herself unfairly saddled with a special duty of care. Individuals who become parents 
thereby acquire a duty of care towards their children; sometimes, foreseeably or not, one 
of the parents must switch to part-time work, or give up paid employment temporarily in 
19 Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J., “Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African-
Americans”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69:797-811, 1995. 
20 Stricker, L. J., & Ward, W. C., “Stereotype threat, inquiring about test takers’ ethnicity and gender, and 
standardized test performance,” Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34:665-693, 2004. Stereotype threat 
research is not without critics; in particular, some raised doubts about the methodology of research that 
attributes women’s and men’s different achievement in mathematics to stereotype threat. Stoet, G.; Geary, 
D. C. “Can stereotype threat explain the gender gap in mathematics performance and achievement?”. 
Review of General Psychology 16:93–102, 2012.
order to care for the child, especially in societies where adequate daycare is unavailable 
or unaffordable. In cases when neither parent wants to do this, women, who are usually 
socialised as care-givers and who tend to earn less than men, face economic, and possibly
psychological, pressure to be the ones who give up full employment21. Moreover, due to 
path-dependency – because they breast-feed and need post-birth recovery leaves, and 
hence spend more time with infants – women tend to be more knowledgeable and 
competent with, and possibly more attached to, their young children than men. A 
mother’s higher level of competence and attachment does not mean that it is hers, more 
than a father’s, duty to opt out of (full) employment in such a case – the child’s interest 
may be sufficiently well served by the fathers’ hands-on care – but it contributes to the 
psychological pressure on mothers to be the ones who stay at home. And so, a woman’s 
decision to exit the labour market in order to live up to her caring duties is restricted by 
the lack of acceptable alternatives; when this is the case, the choice is less than fully 
voluntary22. As Anne Alstott noticed, because parenthood comes with a “no exit” clause –
parents acquire the duty to provide continuity in care to their children – it significantly 
restricts parents’ autonomy once they have settled into the parental role23. And it 
particularly restricts the autonomy of the parents who are the only hands-on care 
providers for their children.
The more general point here is that gender norms limit women’s autonomy by 
imposing higher opportunity costs on their, than on men’s, pursuit of parenthood24: 
21 Susan Moller Okin, 1989, especially pp.134-169, 1989. Allen, Anita. 2008. “Rationalising Oppression.” 
Journal of Power 1(1): 51-65
22 Assuming that a choice is voluntary if and only if it is not motivated by a lack of acceptable alternatives. 
See Serena Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
23 Asltott 2004.
24 See also Andrew Mason, “Equality, Personal Responsibility, and Gender Socialisation”, Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 100(3):227– 46, 2000.
Combining parenthood with full-time employment is harder for women, who are socially 
expected to assume the caring role, who tend to earn less them men and who 
(subsequently) have more difficulties than men in finding a partner willing and capable to
assume the role of main care-giver or, at least, to share this role equally. Policies that add 
to the incentive structure which keeps women away from the market, then, are not 
necessarily enhancing women’s autonomy.
Not always their choices
There is an even more important rejoinder to the claim that the negative effects of 
care-supporting policies on women are morally innocent: Such policies can lower the 
expected labour market opportunities of one group of women as a result of choices made 
by another group of women. Here, too, there are several complementary mechanisms to 
be considered. Women are typically associated with higher social skills, like being caring 
and competent to meet others’ needs, but not with competence in leadership and 
innovation skills. The retreat from the labour market of some women can reinforce these 
biases and thus reinforce explicit sexist beliefs against women in general. More 
controversially, it can also reinforce implicit biases – that is, a tendency to unconsciously 
associate certain characteristics with femininity and others with masculinity and to 
express approval when individuals’ behaviour displays the associations attached to their 
sex and disapproval when it does not25. Scholars of implicit bias claim that virtually 
everybody harbours such biases, with the result that women are evaluated less favourably
in the workplace than men who have the exact same qualifications and 
25 Michael Brownstein, “Implicit Bias”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015.
accomplishments26. Implicit bias may partly explain women’s lesser presence in the 
labour market in general and in some fields in particular, as well as women’s difficulties 
in breaking through various glass ceilings. Biases against women’s leadership qualities 
are much more likely to affect women’s opportunities to the more attractive positions. 
This is because, in existing societies, highly competitive individuals with leadership 
potential are believed to be the most qualified for the best rewarded positions.
If, as a consequence of a care-supporting policy, enough women retreat from the 
labour market in general, and possibly from some fields in particular, this will reinforce 
mechanisms that perpetuate general discrimination and marginalisation of women who 
apply for positions that require leadership abilities and high competitiveness. Hence, 
women other than those who respond to the policy will be even more likely to have their 
opportunities for positions of advantage curtailed by gender biases.
Further, there exists a fully conscious and rational mechanism that can impose on 
some women the price of other women’s choices to decrease their participation in the 
labour market: statistical discrimination. If women on average are more likely than men 
to quit their job or to reduce their labour participation when they have children, and if 
employee turnover is costly, then it is economically rational for employers to give 
preference to prospective male workers. Even nonsexist employers who are immune to 
implicit biases – assuming they exist – will respond with higher levels of statistical 
discrimination to women’s lower participation in the labour market27. Take, for example, 
the case of hiring scientists who need expensive equipment tailored for the purposes of 
their research agenda. Each time a lab loses – permanently or for extended periods of 
26 Rhea E. Steinpreis, Katie A. Anders and Dawn Ritzke, “The Impact of Gender on the Review of the 
Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A National Empirical Study”, Sex Roles 41(7): 
509-528, 1999.
27 Bergmann 1998.
time – such an employee they incur a great financial loss (some research projects become
soon obsolete so they cannot be simply be put on hold during one’s care leave). With 
these kinds of jobs there are powerful economic incentives to avoid hiring individuals 
who are more likely to take significant leaves.
A policy that enables women to avoid the labour market therefore will also, 
indirectly, cause other women to pay for these choices with a more limited set of 
opportunities for positions in which employee turnover is costly. Thus, as in the case of 
implicit bias, statistical discrimination is more likely to operate against a woman the 
better the job to which she aspires: In existing societies such positions usually require 
high qualifications which, in turn, depend on a commitment to full-time careers. In 
contrast, the jobs where a high level of staff turnover is not particularly problematic for 
employers, because it is easy and cheap to train new workers, come with significantly 
lesser benefits.
Therefore, feminists rightly worry that policies that directly or indirectly protect 
care-giving will strengthen gender norms against women’s access to positions of 
advantage. These norms are bad for gender fairness, because they make women’s and 
men’s access to positions of advantage dependent, in a morally arbitrary way, on them 
being women or men. This would be serious criticism in circumstances characterised by 
background distributive justice, where the inequalities in the pay-offs associated with 
different jobs were just and in which the unemployed – or, at least, the involuntarily 
unemployed – were not at risk of undue poverty and social marginalisation. Yet, it has 
little, if any, weight in a world displaying unjustly large inequalities. The rest of the paper
explains why.
Equality of opportunities to positions of advantage in unjust circumstances
When it comes to the distribution of jobs, there are two particularly popular 
versions of the principle of equality of opportunities (henceforth EO), both of which are 
meritocratic28. One version requires that access to positions of advantage depend only on 
individuals’ talents and ambition. This is often called “formal EO“, and prohibits sex-
based discrimination. In a more egalitarian, and demanding, version, usually referred to 
as “fair equality of opportunity“ (henceforth FEO), the principle states that individuals‘ 
prospects should only be determined by native talent and ambition29. In this form, the 
principle also requires that girls’ and boy’s talents and ambitions be equally cultivated.
One virtue of both versions is expressive: by prohibiting employers to give less 
consideration to an applicant merely on account of their sex, EO principles send the right 
message that women and men are moral equals. As I argue below, this expressive value 
can be realised without ensuring that all individuals have equal opportunities for positions
of advantage.
The most convincing defense of the more egalitarian version of the principle, 
usually referred to as “fair equality of opportunity” (henceforth FEO) – is prioritarian. 
Rawls30, for instance, thought FEO regulates competition for social positions in societies 
that only tolerate those inequalities of outcome that are necessary to incentivise talented 
individuals to be socially productive31. In such circumstances, FEO contributes to the 
28 Some luck egalitarians support a version of the principle as applied to the distribution of opportunities to 
overall advantage, rather than to the distribution of jobs. A (luck) egalitarian principle of equal 
opportunities to flourishing is non-meritocratic – it tracks neither inborn or cultivated talent.
29 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Harvard University Press, 2001, 44.
30 Rawls 2001.
31 For a recent and more explicit defense of this view, see Thomas Scanlon, Why does Inequality Matter?, 
Oxford University Press, 2018.
maximisation of the social output which is then distributed according to prioritarian 
principles; this process maximises the prospects of the worst off. Yet, this defense of FEO
depends on prioritarian redistribution actually taking place, and therefore implies nothing 
about the truth or weight of FEO in societies in such redistribution does not actually take 
place. Here I assume that existing and predicted levels of inequality in current societies 
fail to meet prioritarian distributive standards, or indeed any other standard likely to be 
supported by a purportedly egalitarian theory. They even fail to meet the more modest, 
sufficientarian standard, that requires that everybody has unconditional access to enough 
resources to lead a decent life.
We therefore have reasons to doubt that FEO has the same weight in unjustly 
inegalitarian societies as it has in perfectly just ones – or, indeed, that it is the correct 
principle regulating competition for positions of advantage. A full analysis of this matter 
is outside the scope of the present paper.32 To settle the question at hand, it is enough to 
examine the likely implications of applying EO to those kinds of positions to which 
women’s access is most likely to be negatively affected by strengthening the mechanisms 
that already obstruct gender equality. By “positions” here I mean roles with a set of 
rights, powers and prerogatives of office; thus, salary and political influence are not 
contingent add-ons to a position, but essential parts of it.
First, the very top positions come with amounts of economic reward, social power
and status that nobody would enjoy in a just society. Some of the positions that lie above 
the glass ceiling which women find difficult to break are, plausibly, of this kind. The first 
32 For more general criticism of different versions of the principle of equal opportunities in societies that fail
to observe any distributive principle see John Baker, Arguing for Equality, London: Verso, 1987, p.46 and 
Anca Gheaus, “Fair equality of opportunity in unjust circumstances”, manuscript. For an argument that 
competitions whose pay-offs are very unequal are not made legitimate by ensuring that competitors enjoy 
equal opportunities see Colin Macleod “Equality of Opportunity and the Consequences of Choice” 
(manuscript).
argument applies to them:
Argument 1
P1 Nobody has a right to a position that confers unjust advantages on those who hold it.
P2 We ought to discount the value of (fair) equality of opportunity for positions to which 
nobody has a right.
P3 Many of the top positions in societies with large unjustifiable inequalities of outcome 
confer unjust advantages on those who hold them.
C1 Therefore, we ought to discount the value of (fair) equality of opportunity for many of
the top positions in societies with large unjustifiable inequalities of outcome.
If C1 is true, improving FEO with respect to top positions cannot be an important 
goal of justice – and surely not one that is as important as improving the situation of 
women who are amongst the worst off due to their care role. I assume P1 is self-evident, 
and so I concentrate on defending P2. One reason why a principle of equal opportunity 
between women and men is so widely endorsed is that it is obviously unfair to deprive 
someone of opportunities to a good for morally irrelevant reasons such as one’s sex. Yet, 
this reason is only relevant in cases in which justice permits people to have some 
opportunity to achieve that good – that is, where it is morally permissible for someone to 
achieve that good. It is unclear that it is morally important to run meritocratically 
competitions for positions that nobody ought to occupy: nobody has a right to such a 
position. Ideally, such positions would be abolished; but, if and as long as such positions 
are up for distribution, a fairer way to distribute them seems to be by lotteries with a 
threshold of competence (to avoid hiring people that would inflict damage) and that give 
everyone an opportunity.
There seems to be something very prejudicial to be denied, specifically due to 
one’s sex, the same opportunities that others have even for goods that no one should have
in the first place: As already noted, a strong reason to uphold equality of opportunity 
between women and men is expressive: If a person is denied, merely on grounds that she 
is a woman, an opportunity to a good G that nobody ought to have, she is given the 
message that she is worth less than a man. This gives grounds of complaint not only to 
her but, plausibly, to all women, since the expressive disvalue of discrimination affects 
women in general. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the woman in question 
has any claim of justice to more opportunities than she already has to G; if the very 
existence of G is unjust, she – like everybody else – should have zero opportunities for it.
More plausibly, the woman in this case has a special claim (alongside the claim that we 
all have that G should be abolished) that any opportunities to G be also denied to her 
male competitors.
Perhaps a meritocratic organisation of competition for goods which nobody ought
to enjoy has some unique value, which I have failed to consider here. (The expressive 
value is not unique to the meritocratic distribution, since, as I explain presently, this value
could also be realised by a quota system.) In this case, even in unjust societies, ideal 
feminist policies would include measures that offset the disruption of equality of 
opportunities between women and men for top positions. But, whether or not EO for top 
positions has any weight in unjust societies, the most significant progress towards justice 
can come from improving even slightly the situation of the worst off. This is a powerful 
argument in favour of care-supporting policies.
Here is a thought experiment to test intuitions about the value of improving 
gender parity for unjust advantages compared to improving the situation of the worst off. 
Any conclusion about its relevance to the issue at hand will, of course, depend on how 
you think about justice – especially economic justice – more generally and, therefore, on 
exactly how unjust you think are our present circumstances. Consider an ancient slave-
holding societies that banned women from holding property and hence also from owning 
slaves. Assume that such a society contemplated a reform granting women the legal right 
to hold slaves, reform which wouldn’t have altered the number of slaves and slave-
owners, but would have eliminated any gender inequality of opportunity to be a slave-
owner. The reform seems to have some moral value because it eliminates one form of 
discrimination against women. But, because it achieves this by giving women 
opportunities to hold an unjust social position, the reform cannot cater to any individual’s
claim of justice: Nobody should hold slaves, hence nobody has a claim to an opportunity 
to hold slaves. Therefore, the reform can possibly improve justice only if the demands of 
justice go beyond fully satisfying the rightful claims of all individuals involved33. In any 
case, the real value of the reform seems to be expressive: it sends the message that 
women and men – even if only of a certain social class! – are moral equals. Yet, the 
reform may also have one kind negative expressive value, because it sends the message 
that women and men are equally responsible for injustice. The morally sound way of 
sending the message of women’s equality is to deny men, as well as women, the right to 
hold slaves – that is, to level down, not up.
33 As I believe is the case; in Anca Gheaus, “The feasibility constraint on the concept of justice”, 
Philosophical Quarterly 63(252):445-464, 2013.
Some may conjecture that the imaginary reform and, by analogy, reforms that 
would unblock women’s access to top positions have instrumental value in the form of 
trickle-down effects. In particular, they may undermine the association between women 
and powerlessness, and as a result improve the opportunities of women across the entire 
society. Yet, this consequence is uncertain (will the trickle-down really happen?) and it 
might be cancelled out by the other, negative, effects of associating powerful women with
the wrong of slave-holding. Most relevantly, any desirable trickle-down effects would 
occur due to improved gender parity – that is, by an increase in equality of outcome 
rather than opportunity. If so, then they could be more directly realised through measures 
that put some women in prominent positions – such as gender quotas. Any desirable 
consequences of having more women in top positions can be achieved through reforms – 
such as quotas – that are much less demanding than achieving EO.
More generally, although it is important to undermine gender norms, not any 
means of fighting them is legitimate: denying care-protection policies (assuming they are 
otherwise desirable in terms of justice) to disadvantaged women, in order to give other 
women more equal opportunities to the top positions is one of the worst ways to attempt 
to undermine gender norms. As well as being morally objectionable, such strategy is also 
likely to be inefficient: Some norms concerning the gendered division of labour are likely 
to be strengthened by care-supporting policies34. But other biases against women could be
strengthened if an otherwise justified policy was opposed on grounds of equal 
opportunities between women and men for top positions: associating women with 
enjoyment of unjust benefits can easily backfire by fueling misogyny. It is safe to say, at 
the very least, that in unjustifiably unequal societies the first concern of justice is to make
34 Robeyns 2000; Gheaus 2008.
sure that existing social positions become more equal; regulating competition for top 
positions by EO seems much less important.
In defense of the second premise, the slavery example is meant merely as a 
heuristic to tease out beliefs about the intrinsic value of non-discrimination in access to 
unjust advantage. Its point, of course, is not to model an analogy to current societies. 
Slave-owning is unjust in part because it denies some people their rights to freedom from 
coercion, and liberals typically give priority to such rights – and their fair distribution – 
over the distribution of other kinds of goods. One may think that current societies in the 
most developed parts of the world thrive from the dire exploitation of some individuals 
whose lack of reasonable alternatives makes their situation, in some respects, akin to that 
of slaves. Examples include firms that rely on sweatshops employing individuals whose 
alternative is starvation, or firms paying less then subsistence wages to some workers 
(who, again, lack alternative) although they can afford to pay exorbitant wages to 
employees in top jobs. Perhaps some of the positions above the glass ceiling that is so 
difficult for women to crack actually depend on violations of the same rights against 
coerced exploitation that are violated slavery. It is far from clear that there is any value in 
improving equal opportunities to positions on the executive board of a company that 
relies on sweatshops.
But the argument does not depend on the belief that some of top positions involve
rights violations on a par with slavery. It is enough to accept that current societies allow 
massive maldistributions of material goods that are, in some respects, akin to theft. One 
could run the thought experiment with other kinds of social injustices, which involve 
violations of lesser rights, such as the right to property. Imagine a group of individuals 
who trade in stolen goods and fail to give the women and the men in the group the same 
opportunity to enjoy the revenues. How valuable would it be to ensure that women and 
men have equal opportunities to share the loot? It is hard to see how individual thieves 
could have an entitlement to an equal opportunity to benefit from theft, or why denying 
such opportunities to women represents an injustice. Indeed, it would be odd if the law 
was to prosecute thieves not only for theft but also for failing to share the loot according 
to an EO principle – as it should do, if discrimination against women thieves was a 
violation of justice.
Even if the second analogy, too, is faulty, because the best positions in rich 
democratic countries are not akin to (benefitting from) theft, one can agree with the more 
modest, comparative claim defended here. If the distribution of economic goods, and, in 
particular, the sharply increasing levels of inequality and insecurity that affect lots of 
people are unjust, then some of the benefits attached to existing top positions would not 
exist in a just society. On most egalitarian accounts, in a just society there would be no 
wages and levels of status and power like those enjoyed by pop and sports stars, many 
CEOs and executive board members, or top employees in Silicon Valley. Yet, in existing 
societies, gender norms unfairly disadvantage women from having the same access to 
such benefits as men. We have much less reason to be concerned with equality of 
opportunity between women and men for such positions than with improvements in the 
situation of the worst off.
Some may think that, unlike the case of slavery or theft, it is not in itself morally 
wrong to enjoy pay-offs like those attached to the best positions available in current 
societies. Sometimes this belief comes from the intuition that it can be legitimate to hold 
competitions in which the highest prize is similar to a sports’ star salary while the lowest 
reward is less than a subsistence wage. I believe that the pull of this intuition depends on 
such competitions being optional, which makes people’s participation in them voluntary. 
Yet, current participation in the job market is not voluntary, since most of us depend on 
jobs for survival35. Moreover, the best positions in existing societies come not only with 
enormous salaries, but also with levels of power and status that may render them 
impermissible even if the competition was entered voluntarily.
Therefore, people who, merely due to their gender, have lesser opportunities to top
positions, lack a claim to more opportunities for such jobs. If so, then there is little reason
to worry about how care-supporting policies set back the opportunities of the better off 
women relative to such positions. The wrongs that statistical discrimination and sexist 
biases inflict on women who aspire to top positions do not consist in depriving them of 
equal opportunities to the material goods, status and power of their male peers. The real 
wrong of, say, paying pop stars who are men significantly more than women pop stars 
one is an expressive wrong, and the real claim that the woman pop star has is that his 
salary to be lowered, not for hers to be increased.
If a consequence of care-supporting policies was the reinforcement of statistical 
discrimination, this would negatively impact on the opportunities of many more women 
than just would-be CEO, executive board members, pop and sports celebrities or top 
employees in Silicon Valley. Women who aspire to less extravagantly well-compensated 
occupations such as in law, medicine, economics, academia, research or politics – and, 
especially, at the higher ranks of these and many other professions – will also be 
negatively affected. Perhaps the benefits associated with some of these jobs would also 
35 See, again, Olsaretti 2004 for how lack of acceptable options affects voluntariness.
exist in a just society. But note that it is likely that only very few positions in our society 
would exist in an egalitarian society. The rights, powers and prerogatives attached to most
currently existing positions may be incompatible with just social relations because of the 
levels of power and status attached to even middle-class typical jobs.
Let me nevertheless concede that some of these positions of advantage would 
exist in a just society. The second argument concerns such positions and is about the 
distribution of opportunities for these positions across the entire population:
Argument 2
P3 Most people who have a shot at positions of advantage are likely to already have had 
more than their fair share of opportunities for such position.
P4 People lack a claim to more than their fair share of opportunities for positions of 
advantage.
C2 Therefore, most people who have a shot at positions of advantage do not have a claim 
to more opportunities then they already have for such positions.
To defend P3: Because in existing societies most people are excluded from 
opportunities to positions of advantage, a majority of the women who fail to secure 
positions of advantage merely on account of their gender are likely to have already had 
more than their fair share of opportunities to such positions36. How much more will 
depend on the relevant conception of equality of opportunity37. Consider two 
possibilities: FEO requires that one’s opportunities should be determined by native talent 
36 Which is not to deny that they are likely to have had fewer opportunities for such positions than similarly 
advantaged men.
37 For an overview of different understandings of equality of opportunity see Andrew Mason, Levelling the 
Playing Field The Idea of Equal Opportunity and its Place in Egalitarian Thought, Oxford University 
Press, 2006.
and ambition alone. Yet, existing societies are far from giving the same nurturing to all 
children; not only gender but also class, race and many other factors contribute to 
unequal nurturing. Given the great inequalities in the cultivation of individuals’ talents, it 
is likely that many people who would compete for any particular position of advantage in
a society that realised FEO cannot even enter that particular competition in existing 
societies. Their talents have not been cultivated enough to allow them to qualify formally.
Alternatively, assume, more modestly, that equality of opportunity is satisfied by having 
careers open to talents; it is very plausible that factors such as friends, family, attendance 
of the right educational institutions and other forms of brute luck – rather than mere 
qualification – determine who is in the run-up for many positions of advantage38. Given 
the great inequalities between individuals’ pedigrees, social connections etc., it is likely 
that many people who would compete for any particular position of advantage in a 
society that realised careers open to talents lack any chance in that particular competition 
in existing societies. Some will not even enter the competition, for lack of information. In
other cases, individuals’ social connections, pedigrees etc. are not sufficiently good for 
them to be given real consideration for the job. If so, the majority of women who fail to 
obtain a desired job merely on account of their gender are likely to have already had 
more than a fair share of opportunities to that position thanks to a better than average 
education, social connections etc. Ensuring that there is no gender disparity of 
opportunity for positions of advantage would not result, in the absence of additional and 
more radical reforms, in the level playing field in the way required by the principle of 
careers open to talents – and even less so by FEO. Rather, it would mostly level the 
38 I argue for this in detail in Anca Gheaus, “Three cheers for the token woman!”, Journal of Applied 
Philosophy, 32(2): 163-176, 2015.
playing field between the already unfairly advantaged women and men.
Again, this is not to conclude that people who fail, merely on account of their 
gender, to secure jobs that confer unjust advantages on those who hold them, have no 
complaints of justice. But their complaint of justice is not a claim for more opportunities 
than they already had – which care-supporting policies may impede. Rather, they have a 
special claim of expressive justice that they not be given the signal that their interests are 
less important than men’s. This is a claim that the men who are favoured merely on 
account of gender have fewer opportunities than they currently have. This aim, again, can
be achieved in the absence of realising EO – for instance, by adopting measures such as 
gender quotas. Moreover, even if care-supporting policies entrench statistical 
discrimination against women, it is not obvious that, on the whole, their consequences for
expressive justice will be negative. Precisely because they would sponsor some women’s 
decision to be care-givers, supporters of such policies believe that they have positive 
consequences in terms of expressive justice; they signal that care – the traditional 
“women’s work” – is valuable39.
The general conclusion from the two arguments is that we should discount the 
value of improving women’s opportunities to top positions and of improving most 
women’s opportunities for positions of advantage for which they stand a real chance. At 
the very least, in societies that seriously fail to realise any egalitarian redistributive ideal 
these aims cannot come close to outweighing the interests of disadvantaged women in 
care-supporting policies.
What about middle positions that come with decent, though not above average, 
39 For the case of BI, see Baker 2008.
pay, benefits and security? Examples may include – depending on the society – office 
jobs or jobs in nursing and teaching. In some places, some such positions – for instance 
accountancy or human resources – do not even require applicants to have university 
education, but, instead, an apprenticeship. German societies, for instance, still have 
desirable jobs that are based on (extensive) vocational education; therefore, it is more 
likely that individuals who did not enjoy more than average levels of opportunities 
throughout their lives may have a real shot at these positions. But the kind of statistical 
discrimination and biases against women that could be amplified by care-supporting 
policies are a lot less likely to further disadvantage women who compete for such jobs. 
First, because such jobs are already fairly feminised, a stronger association between 
women and care need not cause women to be perceived as less competent teachers or 
nurses. Second, jobs of this kind are often easier to regulate for employees’ protection, 
especially when the employer is the state (as it is the case, in Europe, with most schools 
and hospitals, and many office jobs). Third, and perhaps more importantly, when women 
in middle-grade jobs use care leaves or a basic income to temporarily exit the job market,
this is unlikely to do the same harm to business as it is the case with jobs that require 
higher levels of training and specialisation. There will be little reason to discriminate 
against women in middle-grade jobs due to their involvement in care work40.
The last point also applies to lower-grade positions – those with benefits that are 
significantly below average. But even assuming that care-supporting policies would 
reinforce women’s association with domesticity, and thus have detrimental effects on 
equality of opportunity for these positions, it is not clear how much of a worry this is. 
40 Senior positions in many such professions are disproportionately occupied by men, and the explanation 
may have to do with the time women take out for care work. If such senior positions are above average, 
then they are covered by Argument 2. But if and when they aren’t women whose opportunities for them are 
negatively affected by care-supporting policies have grounds for complaint.
The women whose interests are most likely to be directly advanced by the introduction of
BI or care wages are single mothers (some of the poorest people in developed countries); 
elderly women who spent much of their adult years caring for children, old parents and 
sick relatives and who, as a result, have meagre pensions; and, in the case of BI, women 
migrants with little education and social capital. These are not the women whose 
opportunities are most likely to be negatively affected by implicit and explicit biases or 
statistical discrimination. Women from poor backgrounds (who are often also from 
immigrant backgrounds) are some of the least likely to stand a chance to be employed in 
positions of advantage or in the higher ranks of any profession. The glass ceiling is not a 
typical problem for women who are chronically unemployed, or in jobs from which they 
can be easily fired whether or not they are pregnant or saddled with care responsibilities. 
For the same reasons, these are also the women whose socialisation into caring roles is 
least likely to deprive them from the non-material benefits of paid work, since they have 
very few opportunities for jobs with such benefits in the first place41.
Further, a large proportion of the low-grade jobs are excessively repetitive and 
boring, demanding in terms of time, and often organised in unnecessary and oppressive 
hierarchies. They seem mostly undesirable and, therefore, better opportunities for them 
seem less beneficial than a secure, substantial and unconditional monthly income or other
types of support for care-givers. 
Another concern is the effect of care-supporting policies on men’s opportunities to
engage in care work on a par with women. A fully spelled-out ideal of gender justice 
requires that men have the same access as women to objectively valuable goods such as 
41 Indeed, BI has historically divided feminists along class lines, with working class women supporting it 
and economically better off women opposing it. See Toru Yamamori, “A Feminist Way to Unconditional 
BI: Claimants Unions and Women’s Liberation Movements in 1970s Britain”, BI Studies, 9(1-2): 1-24, 
2014.
raising a family, and the same opportunities to avoid bads like exploitative or 
meaningless work42. The effect of women’s exit from the labour market may be to 
strengthen those gender norms which make it very hard for men to be full time, and 
sometimes also part-time, care-givers: There is peer pressure on men to behave less 
caringly than women, there are also ridiculing stereotypes of men who do “women’s 
work”, and men receive less training as potential care-givers43. Implicit biases against 
men and statistical discrimination against their presence on the sites of childrearing and 
in professions that involve direct access to children (like baby-sitter or nursery worker) 
can make it difficult for them to gain access to some caring professions. But if, in spite of
their limited opportunities in this domain, men are overall better off than women, their 
interest cannot be more weighty than the interest of the worst off women in care-
supporting policies. This being said, there is a remaining concern about those men who 
are among the worst off members of society and who would like to take on caring roles; 
stronger gender norms can make it even harder for such men to access paid care work44. I 
assume they are a very small minority, and therefore this worry does not constitute a 
reason to oppose care-supporting policies; but it might constitute an additional reason for 
states to undermine the gendered division of labour by other means. 
Therefore, care-supporting policies are least likely to have net negative effects on 
the very worst off women. Advancing the interests of these categories of women carries 
significant weight – making the case in favour of care-supporting policies stronger than 
the case against them. These policies include a (suitably-designed) BI, long subsidised 
42 Anca Gheaus, “Gender Justice”,  Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6(2), 2012.
43 Against this possibility, Julieta Elgarte (2008) argues that a basic income would provide due protection to 
caregivers and double-shifters while also enabling women and men to spend less time in paid employment, 
which increase men’s opportunities to become care-givers in their families. The same applies to other care-
supporting policies such as gender-egalitarian parental leaves or flexible working hours for care-givers.
44 I am grateful to Thomas Douglas for drawing my attention to this.
care leaves, or split paychecks. When it is possible to means-test care-supporting policies 
(obviously not in the case of BI but perhaps in the case of care leaves), doing so might be 
best suited to advance all the feminist goals. Means-testing would avoid incentivising 
women to stay away from the labour market, and thus would protect EO at the same time 
as helping the worst off45.
Conclusion
To the extent to which the introduction of care-supporting policies would bring 
systematic and enduring improvement for the worst-off women, the fact that it would also
set back equality of opportunity between women and men to positions of advantage does 
not raise a weighty concern. If women make a majority of the disadvantaged members of 
society, the rebuttal of the equality of opportunity criticism to these policies can be 
upheld by egalitarian feminists in virtue of their feminist convictions, as well as in virtue 
of their egalitarian convictions.
The relevance of the present argument goes beyond its implications concerning 
the introduction of care-supporting policies. An influential strand in contemporary 
feminism is driven by the ideal of equal opportunities between women and men for 
positions of advantage. Yet, this ideal has very limited, if any, weight, unless and until 
two other goals are realised: first, ensuring that the pay-offs associated with positions of 
advantage are permissible, by bringing inequalities of outcome in line with the 
requirements of justice. And, second, ensuring that individuals enjoy equality of 
opportunity at all stages of their lives.
45 I am thankful to an anonymous referee of this journal for drawing my attention to this point.
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